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Abstract
In a recent paper Chan et al. [SODA ’19] proposed a relaxation of the notion of (full) memory obliv-
iousness, which was introduced by Goldreich and Ostrovsky [J. ACM ’96] and extensively researched
by cryptographers. The new notion, differential obliviousness, requires that any two neighboring inputs
exhibit similar memory access patterns, where the similarity requirement is that of differential privacy.
Chan et al. demonstrated that differential obliviousness allows achieving improved efficiency for several
algorithmic tasks, including sorting, merging of sorted lists, and range query data structures.
In this work, we continue the exploration and mapping of differential obliviousness, focusing on
algorithms that do not necessarily examine all their input. This choice is motivated by the fact that the
existence of logarithmic overhead ORAM protocols implies that differential obliviousness can yield at
most a logarithmic improvement in efficiency for computations that need to examine all their input. In
particular, we explore property testing, where we show that differential obliviousness yields an almost
linear improvement in overhead in the dense graph model, and at most quadratic improvement in the
bounded degree model. We also explore tasks where a non-oblivious algorithm would need to explore
different portions of the input, where the latter would depend on the input itself, and where we show that
such a behavior can be maintained under differential obliviousness, but not under full obliviousness. Our
examples suggest that there would be benefits in further exploring which class of computational tasks
are amenable to differential obliviousness.
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1 Introduction
A program’s memory access pattern can leak significant information about the private information used by
the program even if the memory content is encrypted. Such leakage can turn into a data protection problem
in various settings. In particular, where data is outsourced to be stored on an external server, it has been
shown that access pattern leakage can be exploited in practical attacks and lead to the compromise of the
underlying data [19, 4, 27, 20, 22]. Such leakages can also be exploited when a program is executed in a
secure enclave environment but needs to access memory that is external to the enclave.
Memory access pattern leakage can be avoided by employing a strategy that makes the sequence of
memory accesses (computationally or statistically) independent of the content being processed. Beginning
with the seminal work of Goldreich and Ostrovsky, it is well known how to transform any program running
on a random access memory (RAM) machine to one with an oblivious memory access pattern while retaining
efficiency by using an Oblivious RAM protocol (ORAM) [10, 28, 13]. Current state-of-the-art ORAM
protocols achieve logarithmic overhead [2], matching a recent lowerbound by Larsen and Nielsen [23],
and protocols with O(1) overhead exist when large blocks are retrieved [6, 26]. To further reduce the
overhead, oblivious memory access pattern protocols have been devised for specific tasks, including graph
algorithms [3, 17], geometric algorithms [8] and sorting [16, 24]. The latter is motivated by sorting being a
fundamental and well researched computational task as well as its ubiquity in data processing.
1.1 Differential Obliviousness
Full obliviousness is rather a strong requirement: any two possible inputs (of the same size) should exhibit
identical or indistinguishable sequences of memory accesses. Achieving full obliviousness via a generic use
of ORAM protocols requires a setup phase with running time (at least) linear in the memory size and then a
logarithmic overhead per each memory access.
A recent work by Chan, Chung, Maggs, and Shi [5] put forward a relaxation of the obliviousness re-
quirement where indistinguishability is replaced with differential privacy. Intuitively, this means that any
two possible neighboring inputs should exhibit memory access patters that are similar enough to satisfy dif-
ferential privacy, but may still be too dissimilar to be “cryptographically” indistinguishable. It is not a priori
clear whether differential obliviousness can be achieved without resorting to full obliviousness. However,
the recent work Chan et al. showed that differential obliviousness does allow achieving improved efficiency
for several algorithmic tasks, including sorting (over very small domains), merging of sorted lists, and range
query data structures.
Furthermore, even the use of ORAM protocols may be insufficient for preventing leakage in cases where
the number of memory probes is input dependent. In fact, Kellaris et al. [20] show that such leakage can
result in a complete reconstruction in the case of retrieving elements specified by range queries, as the
number of records returned depends on the contents of the data structure. Full obliviousness would require
that the sequence of memory accesses would be padded to a maximal one to avoid such leakage, a solution
that would have a dire effect on the efficiency of many algorithms. Differential obliviousness may in some
cases allow achieving meaningful privacy while maintaining efficiency. Examples of such protocols include
the combination of ORAM with differentially private sanitization by Kellaris et al. [21] and the more recent
work of Chan et al. [5] on range query data structures, which avoids using ORAM.
1.2 This Work: Exploring Differential Obliviousness
Noting that the existence of logarithmic overhead ORAM protocols implies that differential obliviousness
can yield at most a logarithmic improvement in efficiency for computations that need to examine all their
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input, we explore tasks where this is not the case. In particular, we focus on property testing and on tasks
where the number of memory accesses can depend on the input.
Property testing. As evidence that differential obliviousness can provide a significant improvement over
full obliviousness, we show in Section 3 that property testers in the dense graph model, where the input is in
the adjacency matrix representation [12], can be made differentially oblivious. This result captures a large
set of testable graph properties [12, 1] including, e.g., graph bipartitness and having a large clique. Testers
in this class probe a uniformly random subgraph and hence are fully oblivious without any modification, as
their access pattern does not depend on the input graph. However, this is not the case if the tester reveals
its output to the adversary, as this allows learning information about the specific probed subgraph. A fully
oblivious tester would need to access a linear-sized subgraph, whereas we show that a differentially oblivious
tester only needs to apply the original tester for O(1) times.1
We also consider property testing in the bounded degree model, where the input is in the incidence
lists model [14]. In this model we provide negative results, demonstrating that adaptive testers cannot,
generally, be made differentially oblivious without a significant loss in efficiency. In particular, in Section 4
we consider differentially oblivious property testers for connectivity in graphs of degree at most two. For
non-oblivious testers, it is known that constant number of probes suffice when the tester is adaptive [14].2
It is also known that any non-adaptive tester for this task requires probing Ω(
√
n) nodes [29]. We show
that this lower bound extends to differentially oblivious testers, i.e., any differentially oblivious tester for
connectivity in graphs of maximal degree 2 requires Ω(
√
n) probes. While this still improves over full
obliviousness, the gap between full and differential obliviousness is in this case diminished.
Locating an Object Satisfying a Property. Here, our goal is to check whether a given data set of objects
includes an object that satisfies a specified property. Without obliviousness requirements, a natural approach
is to probe elements in a random order until an element satisfying the property is found or all elements were
probed. If a p fraction of the elements satisfy the property, then the expected number of probes is 1/p. This
algorithm is in fact instance optimal when the data set is randomly permuted.3
A fully oblivious algorithm would require Ω(n) probes on any dataset even when p = 1. In contrast,
we demonstrate in Section 5 that with differential obliviousness instance optimality can, to a large extent,
be preserved. Our differentially oblivious algorithm always returns a correct answer and makes at most m
probes with probability at least 1− e−O(mp).
Prefix Sum. Our last example considers a sorted dataset (possibly, the result of an earlier phase in the
computation). Our goal is to compute the sum of all records in the (sorted) dataset that are less than or equal
to a given value a.4
Without obliviousness requirements, one can find the greatest record less than or equal to value a,
say, using binary search, and then compute the prefix sum by a quick scan through all records appearing
before such record. This algorithm is in fact nearly instance optimal, as it can be shown that any algorithm
which returns the correct exact answer with non-negligible probability must probe all entries greater than a.
However, fully oblivious algorithms would have to probe the entire dataset.
In Section 6 we give our nearly instance optimal differentially oblivious prefix sum algorithm. As
the probes of a binary search would leak information about the memory content, we introduce a differen-
1We omit dependencies on privacy and accuracy parameters from this introductory description.
2In an adaptive tester at least one choice of a node to probe should depend on information gathered from incidence lists of
previously probed nodes.
3Our treatment of instance optimality is rather informal. The concept was originally presented in [9].
4See Section 6 for the definition of privacy.
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tially oblivious “simulation” of the binary search. Our differentially oblivious binary search runs in time
O(log2 n).
We also address the scenario where there are multiple prefix sum queries to the same database. If the
number of queries is bounded by some integer t, then each differentially oblivious binary search will run
in time O(t log2 n) (as we need to run the search algorithm with a smaller privacy parameter ε). Using
ORAM, one can answer such queries with O(n log n) prepossessing time and O(log2 n) time per query.
Combining our algorithm and ORAM, we can amortize the pre-processing time over O(
√
n) queries, that
is, without any pre-processing, the running of time of answering the i-th query is O(i log4 n) for the first
O(
√
n) queries and O(log2 n) for any further query.
1.3 Background Work
The work by Chan, Chung, Maggs, and Shi [5] mentioned above is most relevant for this article. Goldreich,
Goldwasser, and Ron [12] initiated the research on graph property testing. Goldreich’s book on property test-
ing [11] gives sufficient background for our discussion. Dwork, McSherry, Nissim, and Smith [7] presented
differential Privacy. For more details on ORAM and a list of relevant papers, the reader can consult [2].
2 Definitions
2.1 Model of Computation
We consider the standard Random Access Memory (RAM) model of computation that consists of a CPU
and a memory. The CPU executes a program and is allowed to perform two types of memory operations:
read a value from a specified physical address, and write a value to a specified physical address. We assume
that the CPU has a private cache of where it can store a O(1) values (and/or a polylogarithmic number of
bits). As an example, in the setting of a client storing its data on the cloud, the client plays the role of the
CPU and the cloud server plays the role of the memory.
We assume that a program’s sequence of read and write operations may be visible to an adversary. We
will call this sequence the program’s access pattern. We will further assume that the memory content is
encrypted so that no other information is leaked about the content read from and stored in memory location.
The program’s access pattern may depend on the program’s input, and may hence leak information about it.
2.2 Oblivious Algorithms
There are various works focused on oblivious algorithms [8, 15, 25] and Oblivious RAM (ORAM) con-
structions [13]. These works adopt “full obliviousness” as a privacy notion. Suppose that M(λ,x) is an
algorithm that takes in two inputs, a security parameter λ and an input dataset denoted x. We denote by
AccessM (λ,x), the ordered sequence of memory accesses the algorithm M makes on the input λ and x.
Definition 2.1 (Fully Oblivious Algorithms). Let δ be a function in a security parameter λ. We say that
algorithm M is δ-statistically oblivious, iff for all inputs x and y of equal length, and for all λ, it holds
that AccessM (λ,x) ≈δ(λ) AccessM (λ,y) where ≈δ(λ) denotes that the two distributions have at most δ(λ)
statistical distance. We say that M is perfectly oblivious when δ = 0.
2.3 Differentially Oblivious Algorithms
Suppose that M(λ,x, q) is an (stateful) algorithm that takes in three inputs, a security parameter λ > 0,
an input dataset denoted by x and a value q. We slightly change the definition of differential oblivious
algorithms given in [5]:
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Experiment ExpA,Mb
Experiment ExpA,Mb (λ, n)
1. (x0,x1, st)←$A1(λ, n)
2. b′←$AM(xb,·)2 (st)
3. Return b′
OracleM(x, q)
1. (out, state)←$M(x, q, state)
2. Output AccessM (x, q, state)
Figure 1: An experiment for defining differential obliviousness.
Definition 2.2 (Neighbor-respecting). We say that two input datasets x and y are neighboring iff they are of
the same length and differ in exactly one entry. We say that A = (A1, A2) is neighbor-respecting adversary
iff for every λ and every n, A1 outputs neighboring datasets x0,x1, with probability 1.
Definition 2.3. Let ε, δ be privacy parameters. Let M be a (possibly stateful) algorithm described as
above. To an adversary A we associate the experiment in Figure 1, for every λ ∈ N. We say that M is
(ε, δ)-adaptively differentially oblivious if for any (unbounded) stateful neighbor-respecting adversary A
we have
Pr[ExpA,M0 (λ, n) = 1] ≤ eε · Pr[ExpA,M1 (λ, n) = 1] + δ.
In Figure 1, AccessM (x, q, state) denotes the ordered sequence of memory accesses the algorithmM makes
on the inputs x, q and state.
Remark 2.4. The notion of adaptivity here is different from the one defined in [5]. We require that the
dataset x remain the same through the experiment whereas in [5] the adaptive adversary can add or remove
entries to the dataset.
As with differential privacy, we usually think about ε as a small constant and require that δ = o(1/n)
where n = |x| [7]. Observe that if M is δ-statistically oblivious then it is also (0, δ)-differentially oblivious.
The following simple lemma will be useful to analyze our algorithms. The proof of the lemma appears
in Appendix A.
Lemma 2.5. LetA be an (ε, 0)-differentially oblivious algorithm and B be an algorithm such that for every
dataset x the statistical distance betweenA(x) and B(x) is at most γ (that is, |Pr[A(x) ∈ S]−Pr[B(x) ∈
S]| ≤ γ for every S). Then, B is an (ε, (1 + eε)γ)-differentially oblivious algorithm.
3 Differentially Oblivious Property Testing of Dense Graphs Properties
In this section, we present a differentially oblivious property tester for dense graphs properties in the adja-
cency matrix representation model. A property tester is an algorithm that decides whether a given object
has a predetermined property or is far from any object having this property by examining a small random
sample of its input. The correctness requirement of property testers ignores objects that neither have the
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property nor are far from having the property. However, the privacy requirement is “worst case” and should
hold for any two neighboring graphs. For the definition of privacy we say that two graphs G,G′ of size n
are neighbors if one can get G′ by changing the neighbors of exactly one node of G.
Property testing of graph properties in the adjacency matrix representation was introduced in [12]. A
graph G = (V,E) is represented by the predicate fG : V × V → {0, 1} such that fG(u, v) = 1 if and only
if u and v are adjacent in G. The notion of distance between graphs is defined to be the number of different
matrix entries over |V |2. This model is most suitable for dense graphs where the number of edges O(|V |2).
We define a property P of graphs to be a subset of the graphs. We write G ∈ P to show that graph G has
the property P . For example, we can define the bipartiteness property, where P is the set of all bipartite
graphs.5 We say that an n-vertex G is γ-far from P if for every n-vertex graph G′ = (V ′, E′) ∈ P it holds
that the symmetric difference between E and E′ is greater than γn2. We define the property testing in this
model as follows:
Definition 3.1 ([12]). A (β, γ)-tester for a graph property P is a probabilistic algorithm that, on inputs
n, β, γ, and an adjacency matrix of an n-vertex graph G = (V,E):
1. Outputs 1 with probability at least β, if G ∈ P .
2. Outputs 0 with probability at least β, if G is γ-far from P .
We say a tester has one-sided error, if it accepts every graph in P with probability 1. We say a tester is
non-adaptive if it determines all its queries to adjacency matrix only based on n, β, γ, and its randomness;
otherwise, we say it is adaptive.
Example 3.2 ([12]). Consider the following (2/3, γ)-tester for bipartiteness: Choose a random subset
A ⊂ V of size O˜(1/γ2) with uniform distribution and output 1 iff the graph induced by A is bipartite.
Clearly, if G is bipartite, then the tester will always return 1. Goldreich et al. [12] proved that if G is γ-far
from a bipartite graph, then the probability that the algorithm returns 1 is at most 1/3.
Recall that in the graph property testing, the tester T chooses a random subset of the graph with uniform
distribution to test the property P . Given the access pattern of the tester T , an adversary will learn nothing
since it is uniformly random. Thus, the access pattern by itself does not reveal any information about the
input graph. However, we assume that the adversary also learns the tester’s output and can hence learn some
information about the input graph based on the output of the tester. To protect this information, we run
tester T for constant number of times and output 1 iff the number of times T outputs 1 exceed a (randomly
chosen) threshold.
Let T be a (β, γ)-tester for a graph property P where β ≤ 1/4. We write cβ,γ for the number of nodes
that T samples. Note that cβ,γ is constant in the graph size and a function of β and γ. For simplicity, we
only consider property testers with one-sided error. In Figure 2, we describe a (β, γ)-tester TesterT that
outputs 1 with probability at least β if G ∈ P and outputs 0 with probability at least β, if G is γ′-far from
P , where γ′ is defined below.
Theorem 3.3. Let ε, δ > 0 and γ′ = γ − 4 ln(1/2δ)cβ,γnε . Algorithm TesterT is an (ε, δ(1 + eε))-differentially
oblivious algorithm that outputs 1 with probability 1 if G ∈ P , and output 0 with probability at least
1− δ − (2δ) 13ε if G is γ′-far from P .
The proof of Theorem 3.3 appears in Appendix A.2.
5 Recall that an undirected graph is bipartite (or 2-colorable) if if its vertices can be 2-partitioned into two parts, V1 and V2, such
that each part is an independent set (i.e., E ⊆ {(u, v) : (u, v) ∈ V1V2}).
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Algorithm TesterT
Input: graph G = (V,E)
1. Let c← 0 and T ← ln(1/2δ)ε
2. For i = 1 to 4T do
(a) If T (G) = 1 then c← c+ 1
(b) Let A be the subset of vertices chosen by tester T
(c) Update graph G to be the induced sub-graph on V \A
3. Tˆ ← 3T + Lap( 1ε )
4. If c ≥ min(Tˆ , 4T ) then output 1, else output 0
Figure 2: A Differentially Oblivious Property Tester for Dense Graphs.
4 Lower Bounds on Testing Connectivity in the Incidence Lists Model
We now consider connectivity differentially oblivious testing in the incidence lists model [14]. In this model
a graph has a bounded degree d and is represented as a function f : V × [d]→ V ∪{0}, where f(v, i) is the
i-th neighbor of v (if no such neighbor exists, then f(v, i) = 0). In this model, the relative distance between
graphs is normalized by dn – the maximal number of edges in the graph. Formally, for two graphs with n
vertices,
distd(G1, G2) ,
|{(v, i) : v ∈ V, i ∈ [d], fG1(v, i) 6= fG2(v, i)}|
dn
.
A (β, γ)-tester in the incidence lists model is defined as in Definition 3.1, where a property P is a set of
graphs whose maximal degree is d and the distance to a property is defined with respect to distd.
Goldreich and Ron [14] showed how to test if a graph is connected in the incidence list model in time
O˜(1/γ). Raskhodnikova and Smith [29] showed that a tester for connectivity (or any non-trivial property)
with run-time o(
√
n) has to be adaptive, that is, the nodes that the algorithm probes should depend on the
neighbors of nodes the algorithm has already probed (e.g., the algorithm probes some node u, discovers that
v is a neighbor and u, and probes v). We strengthen their results by showing that any tester for connectivity
in graphs of maximal degree 2 and run-time o(
√
n) cannot be a differentially oblivious algorithm. We
stress that adaptivity alone is not a reason for inefficiency with differential obliviousness. In fact, there exist
differentially oblivious algorithms that are adaptive (e.g., our algorithm in Section 6).
Theorem 4.1. Let ε, δ > 0 such that e4εδ < 1/16n. Every (ε, δ)-differentially private (3/4, 1/3)-tester for
connectivity in graphs with maximal degree 2 runs in time Ω(
√
n/e2ε).
Proof. Let TESTER be a (3/4, 1/3)-tester for connectivity in graphs of degree at most 2. We somewhat
relax the definition of probes and assume that once the tester probes a node, it sees all edges adjacent to
this node. We prove that if TESTER probes less than c
√
n/e2ε nodes (for some constant c), then it is not
(ε, δ)-oblivious.
Assume that n ≡ 0 (mod 3). LetG1 = (V,E1) be a cycle of length n andG2 = (V,E1) consist of n/3
disjoint triangles. Clearly, G1 is connected and G2 is 1/3-far from a connected graph. For a permutation
pi : V → V , define pi(Gi) = (V, pi(Ei)), where pi(Ei) = {(pi(u), pi(v)) : (u, v) ∈ Ei}, and let perm(Gi)
be a random graph isomorphic to Gi, that is, perm(Gi) = pi(Gi) for a permutation pi chosen with uniform
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distribution.6 On the random graph perm(G) TESTER has to say “yes” with probability at least 3/4 and on
the random graph perm(G2) TESTER has to say “no” with probability at least 3/4.
Observation 4.2. If TESTER does not probe two distinct nodes whose distance is at most two, then TESTER
sees a collection paths of length two and cannot know if the graph is perm(G1) or perm(G2).
Claim 4.3. Given the random graph perm(G1), the tester has to probe two distinct nodes whose distance
is at most 2 with probability at least 1/2.
Proof. Consider TESTER’s answer when it sees a collection of paths of length 2. Assume first that the tester
returns “No” with probability at least half in this case and let p be the probability that TESTER probes two
distinct nodes whose distance is at most two on the random graph perm(G1). The probability that TESTER
returns “Yes” on perm(G1) is at most p+ 0.5(1− p) = 0.5 + 0.5p. Thus, 0.5 + 0.5p ≥ 3/4, i.e., p ≥ 0.5.
If the tester returns “Yes” with probability at least half, then, by symmetric arguments, with probability
at least 1/2 TESTER has to probe two nodes whose distance is at most two on the random graph perm(G2).
For a permutation pi, if the distance between two nodes in pi(G2) is at most 2, then the distance between
these two nodes in pi(G1) is at most 2. Thus, by Observation 4.2,
Pr[TESTER probes 2 nodes whose distance is 1 or 2 on perm(G1)]
≥ Pr[TESTER probes 2 nodes whose distance is 1 or 2 perm(G2)] ≥ 1/2.
Denote the nodes of G1 by V = {v0, . . . , vn−1} and define a distribution on pairs of graphs H1, H2,
obtained by the following process:
• Choose a permutation pi : V → V with uniform distribution and let H1 = pi(G1).
• Denote H1 = (V,E1) and uj = pi(vj) for j ∈ [n].
• Choose with uniform distribution two indices i, j such that j ∈ {i + 4, i + 3, . . . , i − 3} (where the
addition is done modulo n).
• Let H2 = (V,E2), where E2 = E1 \ {(ui, ui+1), (uj , uj+1)} ∪ {(ui, uj), (ui+1, uj+1)}.
The graphs are described in Figure 3. Note that H2 is also a a random graph isomorphic to G1, thus, given
H2 one cannot know which pair of non-adjacent nodes ui, uj was used to create H2.
Observe that H1 and H2 differ on 4 nodes. Since TESTER is (ε, δ)-differntially oblivious, for every
algorithm A,
Pr[A(H1, H2,AccessTESTER(H1)) = 1] ≤ e4ε · Pr[A(H1, H2,AccessTESTER(H2)) = 1] + 4e4εδ.
Consider the following algorithm A:
If ui and at least one of ui+1, ui+2 is probed by TESTER(H) prior to seeing any other pair of nodes of
distance at most 2 in H1 or H2, then return 1 otherwise return 0.
Claim 4.4. Let i ∈ {1, 2}. Suppose that TESTER probes at most q nodes. Pick at random with uniform
distribution two nodes in V with distance at least 3 in Hi. The probability that TESTER(Hi) probes both u
and v prior to seeing any two nodes of distance at most 2 in Hi is O(q2/n2) (where the probability is over
the random choice of u, v and the randomness of TESTER).
6 When we permute a graph, we also permute its incident list representation, i.e., if (u, v) ∈ pi(E), then with probability half v
will be the first neighbor of u and with probability half it will be the second.
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Figure 3: The graphs H1 and H2.
Proof. The node u is a uniformly distributed node in Hi and v is any node of distance at least 3 from v, thus
there are n(n− 5)/2 options for {u, v}. Given a collection of paths of length at most 2 in Hi all options are
equally likely.
Let w1, . . . , wk be the nodes probed in some execution of TESTER. Fix some pair of indices k1 < k2.
The probability that {ui, ui+1} = {wk1 , wk+2} is at most 1/n(n − 5). Thus, the probability that u and v
are probed is at most (
q
2)
n(n−5)/2 = O(q
2/n2).
Claim 4.5. Assume that TESTER probes at most q queries. The probability that A(H1) = 1 is at least
1/2n−O(q2/n2).
Proof. By Claim 4.3, the probability that TESTER probes at least one pair of nodes with distance at most
2 is at least 1/2. Given that this event occurs, the probability that the random ui (chosen with uniform
distribution) has the smallest index in the first such pair in H1 (i.e., the first pair is either (ui, ui+1) or
(ui, ui+2)) is at least 1/n.
Clearly, given these events no two nodes with distance at most 2 in H1 were probed prior to probing
the pair containing ui. Furthermore, there are O(1) pairs of nodes that are of distance at most 2 in H2 and
are of distance greater than 2 in H1. By Claim 4.4, the probability that such pair is probed prior to TESTER
probing a pair of distance at most 2 in H1 is O(q2/n2).
Claim 4.6. Suppose that TESTER probes at most q nodes. The probability that A(H2) = 1 is O(q2/n2).
Proof. The node ui is a uniformly distributed node in H2. Furthermore, the nodes ui+1 is a uniformly
distributed node of distance at least 3 from ui in H2, thus by Claim 4.4, the probability that TESTER probes
both ui and ui+1 prior to seeing any pair of distance at least 2 in H2 is O(q2/n2). This probability can only
decrease if we require that TESTER probes both ui and ui+1 prior to seeing any pair of distance at least 2 in
H1 and in H2.
By the same arguments, the probability that TESTER probes both ui and ui+2 prior to seeing any pair of
distance at least 2 in H1 and in H2 is O(q2/n2).
To conclude the proof of Theorem 4.1, we note that by (4) and Claims 4.5 and 4.6
1
2n
−O(q2/n) ≤ Pr[A(H1) = 1] ≤ e4ε Pr[A(H2) = 1] + e4εδ ≤ e4εO(q2/n2) + e4εδ.
Since e4εδ ≤ 1/4n, it follows that q = Ω(√n/e2ε).
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5 Differentially Oblivious Algorithm for Locating an Object
Given a dataset of objects x our goal is to locate an object that satisfies a propertyP , if one exists. E.g., given
a dataset consisting of employee records, find out an employee with income in the range $35, 000–$70, 000
if at least one such an employee exists in the dataset.
Absent privacy requirements, a simple approach is to probe elements of the dataset in a random order
until an element satisfying the property is found or all elements were probed. If a p fraction of the dataset en-
ries satisfy P then the expected number of elements sampled by the non-private algorithm is 1/p. However,
a perfectly oblivious algorithm would require Ω(n) probes on any dataset, in particular on a dataset where
all elements satisfy P , where non-privately one probe would suffice. To see why, let P(x) = 1 if x = 1 and
P(x) = 0 otherwise and let x include exactly one 1-entry in a uniformly random location. Observe that in
expectation it requires Ω(n) memory probes to locate the 1-entry in x. Perfect obliviousness would hence
imply an Ω(n) probes on any input.
We give a nearly instance optimal differentially oblivious algorithm that always returns a correct answer.
Except for probability e−Ω(mp) the algorithm halts after m steps.
Detailed Algorithm. Given the access pattern of the non-private algorithm, an adversary can learn that the
last probed element satisfies P . To hide this information, we change the stopping condition to having probed
at least a (randomly chosen) threshold of elements satisfying P . If after n/2 probes the number of elements
satisfying P is below the threshold the entire dataset is scanned. Our algorithm LocateP is described in
Figure 4. On a given array x, algorithm LocateP outputs 1 iff there exists an element in x satisfying the
property P .
Algorithm LocateP
Input: dataset x = (x1, . . . , xn)
1. Let c← 0, ε′ = ε2 log(2/δ) , and T ← 1ε′ ln lognδ
2. For i = 1 to n/2 do
(a) Choose j ∈ [n] with uniform distribution
(b) If P(xj) = 1 then c← c+ 1
(c) If i is an integral power of 2 then
i. Tˆ ← T + Lap( 1ε′ )
ii. If c > max(Tˆ , 0) then output 1
3. Scan the entire dataset and if there is an element satisfying P then output 1, else output 0
Figure 4: A Differentially Oblivious Locate Algorithm.
We remark that Algorithm LocateP uses a mechanism similar to the the sparse vector mechanism of [18].
However, in our case instead of using a single noisy threshold accross all steps, Algorithm LocateP generates
in each step a noisy threshold Tˆ = T + Lap( 1ε′ ). The value of T ensures that with high probability Tˆ > 0.
The proof of Theorem 5.1 is given in Appendix A.3.
Theorem 5.1. Algorithm LocateP is an (ε, δ(1 + eε))-differentially oblivious algorithm that outputs 1 iff
there exists an element in the array that satisfies property P . For m = Ω(T/p log(T/p)), with probability
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1− e−Ω(mp) it halts in time at most m, where T = 2 log(2/δ)ε ln lognδ .
6 Differentially Oblivious Prefix Sum
Suppose that there is a dataset consisting of sorted sensitive user records, and one would like to compute
the sum of all records in the (sorted) dataset that are less than or equal to a value a in a way that respects
individual user’s privacy. We call this task differentially oblivious prefix sum. For the definition of privacy
we say that two datasets of size n are neighbors if they agree on n− 1 elements (although, as sorted arrays
they can disagree on many indices). For example, (1, 2, 3, 4) and (1, 3, 4, 5) are neighbors and should have
similar access pattern.
Without privacy one can find the greatest record less than or equal to value a, and then compute the prefix
sum by a quick scan through all records appearing before such record. Any perfectly secure algorithm must
read the entire dataset (since it is possible that all elements are smaller than a). Here, we give a differentially
oblivious prefix sum algorithm that for many instances is much faster than any perfectly oblivious algorithm.
Intuition. Absent privacy requirements, using binary search, one can find the greatest element less than
or equal to a, and then compute the prefix sum by a quick scan through all records that appear before such
record. However, the binary search access pattern allows the adversary to gain sensitive information about
the input. Our main idea is to approximately simulate the binary search and obfuscate the memory accesses
to obtain differential obliviousness. In order to do that, we first divide the input array into k chunks (where
k is polynomial in 1/ε, log 1/δ, and log n). Then, we find the chunk that contains the greatest element less
than or equal to a by comparing the first element (hence, the smallest element) of each chunk to a. Let I be
the index of such chunk. Next, we compute a noisy interval that contains I using the Laplacian distribution.
We iteractively repeat this process on the noisy interval, where in each step we eliminate more than a quarter
of the elements of the interval. We continue until the size of the array is less than or equal to k. Next, we
scan all elements in the remaining array and find the index of the greatest element smaller than or equal to
a. Let i be the index of such element; we compute the prefix sum by scanning the array x until index i.
The Search Algorithm. We present a search algorithm in Figure 5; on input x = (x1, . . . , xn) and
a this algorithm finds the largest index I such that xI ≤ a. To compute the prefix sum, we compute
Iˆ = I + Lap(1/ε) + log 1/δε and scan the first Iˆ elements of the dataset, summing only the first I . We show
in Theorem 6.2 that our search algorithm is (ε, δ)-differentially oblivious.
Remark 6.1. We prove that algorithm SEARCH is an (ε, 0)-differentially private algorithm that returns a
correct index with probability at least 1− β. We could change it to an (ε, δ)-differentially private algorithm
that never errs. This is done by truncating the noise to log 1/δ
′
ε′ .
Theorem 6.2. Let β < 1/n and ε < log2 n. Algorithm SEARCH is an (ε, 0)-differentially oblivious algo-
rithm that, for any input array with size n and a ∈ R, returns a correct index with probability at least 1−β.
The running time of Algorithm SEARCH is O(1ε log
2 n log 1β ).
Theorem 6.2 is proved in Appendix A.4.
6.1 Dealing with Multiple Queries
We extend our prefix sum algorithm to answer multiple queries. We can answer a bounded number of
queries by running the differentially oblivious prefix sum algorithm multiple times. That is, when we want
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Algorithm SEARCH
Input: a dataset x = (x1, . . . , xn) and a value a
1. Let ε′ ← ε2.5 logn , δ′ ← δ2.5 logn , k ← d 4 log(1/δ
′)
ε′ e, min← 0, and max← n
2. While max−min > k do
(a) c← b(max−min)/kc
(b) Let y = (y1, . . . , yk), where yi = xmin+i·c for every i ∈ [k]
(c) Scan the entire dataset y and find the maximal index I such that yI ≤ a; if there is no such
element then I ← 0
(d) noise← Lap( 1ε′ )
(e) min = max{0,min +b(I + noise− log 1/δ′ε′ ) · cc} and max = min{n,min +b(I + noise +
log 1/δ′
ε′ + 1) · cc}
3. Scan the entire dataset x between min and max and return the the maximal index I such that
xI ≤ a; if there is no such element then I ← 0
Figure 5: A Differentially Oblivious Search Algorithm.
an (ε, 0)-oblivious algorithm correctly answering t queries with probability at least 1 − β, we execute
algorithm SEARCH t times with privacy parameter ε/t and error probability β/t (each time also computing
the appropriate prefix sum). Thus, the running time of the algorithm is O( t
2
ε log
2 n log tβ ) (excluding the
scan time for computing the sum).
On the other hand, we can use an ORAM to answer unbounded number of queries. That is, in a pre-
processing stage we store the n records and for each record we store the sum of all records up to this record.
Thereafter, answering each query will require one binary search. Using the ORAM of [2], the pre-processing
will take time O(n log n) and answering each query will take time O(log2 n). Thus, the ORAM algorithm
is more efficient when t ≥ √n.
We use ORAM along with our differentially oblivious prefix sum algorithm to answer unbounded num-
ber of queries while preserving privacy, combining the advantages of both of the previous algorithms.
Theorem 6.3. Algorithm MULTISEARCH, described in Figure 6, is an (ε, 0)-oblivious algorithm, which ex-
ecutes Algorithm SEARCH at mostO(
√
n) times, where the run time of the t-th execution isO( tε log
3 n log nβ ),
scans the original database at most once, and in addition each query run time is at most O(log2 n).
Proof. First note that we only pay for privacy in the executions of algorithm SEARCH (reading and writing
to the ORAM is perfectly private). In the t-th execution of algorithm SEARCH, we insert at least 2t elements
to the ORAM, thus after
√
n executions we inserted at least
∑√n
t=1 2t = n elements to the ORAM.
By simple composition, algorithm MULTISEARCH is (ε′, 0)-differentialy private, where
ε′ =
√
n∑
t=1
ε
t log n
≤ ε
log n
(ln
√
n+ 1) ≤ ε,
where the last inequality is implied by the sum of the harmonic series.
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Algorithm MULTISEARCH
Input: a dataset x = (x1, . . . , xn)
1. t← 1, M ← 0
2. For every query a:
(a) if the greatest element in the ORAM is greater than a or all records are in the ORAM (that is
M = n) then answer the query using the ORAM
(b) Otherwise,
i. execute algorithm SEARCH with privacy parameter εt logn and accuracy parameter β/
√
n
for the database starting at record M + 1 and let I the largest index in this database such
that xI ≤ a
ii. insert the first max{I, 2t} elements of this database to the ORAM; for each element also
insert the sum of all elements in the array up to this element
iii. t← t+ 1, M ←M + max{I, 2t}
Figure 6: A Differentially Oblivious Search Algorithm for Multiple Queries.
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A Missing Proofs
A.1 Proof of Lemma 2.5
Proof. Let x and y be two neighboring datasets and S be a sets of outputs. Then,
Pr[B(x) ∈ S] ≤ Pr[A(x) ∈ S] + γ
≤ eε Pr[A(y) ∈ S] + γ
≤ eε(Pr[B(y) ∈ S] + γ) + γ
= eε Pr[B(y) ∈ S] + (1 + eε)γ.
A.2 Proof of the Correctness and Privacy of Algorithm TESTERT
Theorem 3.3 is implied by the following lemmas.
Lemma A.1. Algorithm TesterT is (ε, δ(1 + eε))-differentially oblivious.
Proof. We first analyze a variant of TesterT , denoted by TESTER′T , in which Step 4 is replaced by “If c > Tˆ
then output 1” (that is, the algorithm does not check if c > min{4T, Tˆ} before deciding in the positive).
Let G = (V,E) and G′ = (V ′, E′) be two neighboring graphs such that they differ on node v ∈ V . Fix
the random choices of subsets A in Step 2b and observe that after the execution of for loop, the count c can
differ by at most 1 between the executions on G and G′. Let T˜ be the smallest integer greater than Tˆ . Since
algorithm TESTER′T uses the Laplace mechanism e
−ε Pr[T˜ < a] ≤ Pr[T˜ < a − 1] ≤ eε Pr[T˜ < a] for
every a. Thus,
Pr[TESTER′T (G) = 1] =
∑
a
Pr[T˜ = a] Pr[c(G) > a]
≤
∑
a
Pr[T˜ = a] Pr[c(G′) > a− 1]
≤ eε
∑
a
Pr[T˜ = a− 1] Pr[c(G′) > a− 1]
≤ eε Pr[TESTER′T (G′) = 1].
Similarly, Pr[TESTER′T (G) = 1] ≥ e−ε Pr[TESTER′T (G′) = 1]. Hence, TESTER′T is (ε, 0)-differentially
oblivious.
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We next prove that TesterT is (ε, δ(1 + eε))-differentially oblivious using Lemma 2.5, that is we prove
that for every graph G, the statistical distance between TesterT (G) and TESTER′T (G) is at most δ. Let
E be the event that Tˆ > 4T and observe that the probability E occurs is at most δ.7 We have that∣∣∣Pr[TesterT (G) = 1] − Pr[TESTER′T (G) = 1]∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣Pr[TesterT (G) = 1|E] − Pr[TESTER′T (G) =
1|E]
∣∣∣Pr[E] ≤ Pr[E] ≤ δ. Thus, by Lemma 2.5, algorithm TesterT is (ε, δ(1 + eε))-differentially oblivi-
ous.
Observe that Algorithm TesterT never errs when G ∈ P as in that case after the for loop is executed
c = 4T and hence in Step 4 TesterT outputs 1. The next lemma analyses the error probability when G is
γ′-far from P .
Lemma A.2. Algorithm TesterT is (1− δ − (2δ) 13ε , γ′)-tester for the graph property P .
Proof. Observe that on Step 2c of the algorithm, we are eliminating at most n · cβ,γ edges. Thus, we are
eliminating at most 4Tncβ,γ edges in total. Then, when G is γ′-far from P , it is also γ-far from P after
the removal of the observed nodes in each step of the for loop. We next prove that Algorithm TesterT fails
with probability at most 2δ
1
3ε . Observe that if Algorithm TesterT fails on G then c ≥ 2T or Lap(1ε ) ≤ −T .
We define Zi to be output of T (G) in the i-th step of the for loop. Let Z =
∑
i Zi. Observe that all Zi are
independent and E[Z] ≤ T . Using the Chernoff Bounds8, we obtain that Pr[Z ≥ 2T ] ≤ e−T/3 = (2δ) 13ε .
We also know Pr[Lap(1ε ) ≤ − ln(1/2δ)ε ] = 0.5e− ln(1/2δ) = δ. Therefore, Algorithm TesterT fails with
probability δ + (2δ)
1
3ε .
A.3 Proof of the Correctness and Privacy of Algorithm LOCATEP
The proof of Theorem 5.1 follows from the following claim and lemmas.
Claim A.3. Let ` ≥ log n/ log log n. The probability that there exists an element j ∈ [n] such that algorithm
LocateP samples the element j in Step 2a more than 2` times is less that 2−`.
Proof. Fix an index j. The probability that the element j is sampled more than 2` times is less than(n/2
2`
)
1
n2`
≤ ( en4` )2` 1n2` < `−2` < 2−2 logn+2 < 22−`/n. The claim follows by the union bound.
Lemma A.4. Let δ < 1/n. Algorithm LocateP is (ε, δ(1 + eε))-differentially oblivious.
Proof. We first analyze a variant of LocateP , denoted by LOCATE′P , in which Step 2(c)ii is replaced by “If
c > Tˆ then output 1” (that is, the algorithm does not check if Tˆ > 0) and no element is sampled more than
2 log(2/δ) times. We analyze the privacy of LOCATE′P(x
′) similarly to the analysis of the sparse vector
mechanism in [18].
Let x and x′ be two neighboring datasets that such that P(xj) = 1 and P(x′j) = 0 for some j. Denote
by τ = (T˜1, . . . , T˜logn) the values of the thresholds in an execution of LOCATE′P , where each threshold
is rounded up to the smallest integer greater than Tˆ . Furthermore, let `τ ∈ [log n] be the index such that
LOCATE′P on input x outputs 1 when i = 2
`τ (if no such i exists, then `τ ∈ dlog ne+1). Observe that in each
execution of Step 2(c)ii the count c on input x is at least the count on input x′ and can exceed it by at most
2 log(2/δ) (since j is sampled at most 2 log(2/δ) times). Thus, LOCATE′P on input x
′ with thresholds τ ′ =
7 Pr[Lap( 1
ε
) ≥ t/ε] = 1
2
e−t for every t > 0. Thus, Pr[E] = Pr[Lap( 1
ε
) ≥ ln(1/2δ)
ε
] = δ.
8Pr[Z ≥ (1 + η)µ] ≤ e−η2µ/(2+η) for any η > 0 where µ is the expectation of Z.
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(T˜1, . . . , T˜`τ−1, T˜`τ − 2 log(2/δ), T˜`τ+1, . . . , T˜logn) outputs 1 when i = 2`τ . Since algorithm LOCATE′P
uses the Laplace mechanism with ε′ = ε/(2 log(1/δ)),
e−ε Pr[T˜`τ = a] ≤ Pr[T˜`τ = a− 2 log(2/δ)] ≤ eε Pr[T˜`τ = a]
for every a. Thus,
Pr[AccessLOCATE
′
P (x) ∈ S]
=
∑
τ=(T˜1,...,T˜logn)
Pr[AccessLOCATE
′
P (x) ∈ S | T˜1, . . . , T˜logn] Pr[T˜1, . . . , T˜logn]
=
∑
τ=(T˜1,...,T˜logn)
Pr[AccessLOCATE
′
P (x′) ∈ S | T˜1, . . . , T˜`τ−1, T˜`τ − 2 log(2/δ), T˜`τ+1, . . . , T˜logn]
· Pr[T˜1, . . . , T˜logn]
≤ eε
∑
τ=(T˜1,...,T˜logn)
Pr[AccessLOCATE
′
P (x′) ∈ S | T˜1, . . . , T˜`τ−1, T˜`τ − 2 log(2/δ), T˜`τ+1, . . . , T˜logn]
· Pr[T˜1, . . . , T˜`τ−1, T˜`τ − 2 log(2/δ), T˜`τ+1, . . . , T˜logn]
= eε Pr[AccessLOCATE
′
P (x′) ∈ S].
Similarly,
Pr[AccessLOCATE
′
P (x) ∈ S]
≥ e−ε
∑
τ=(T˜1,...,T˜logn)
Pr[AccessLOCATE
′
P (x′) ∈ S | T˜1, . . . , T˜`τ−1, T˜`τ − 2 log(2/δ), T˜`τ+1, . . . , T˜logn]
· Pr[T˜1, . . . , T˜`τ−1, T˜`τ − 2 log(2/δ), T˜`τ+1, . . . , T˜logn]
= e−ε Pr[AccessLOCATE
′
P (x′) ∈ S].
We next prove that LocateP is (ε, δ(1 + eε))-differentially oblivious using Lemma 2.5. I.e, we prove
that for every dataset x, the statistical distance between AccessLocateP (x) and AccessLOCATE
′
P (x) is at
most δ. Notice that if all the thresholds are positive and all elements are sampled at most 2 log(2/δ) times
then LocateP(x) and LOCATE′P(x) have the same access pattern. By Claim A.3, the probability that there
exists a j that is sampled more than 2 log(2/δ) is at 2− log(2/δ) = δ/2. We next observe that the probability
that a threshold Tˆ = T + Lap( 1ε′ ) is negative is at most δ/2. Recall that Pr[Lap(
1
ε′ ) ≤ −t/ε′] = 12e−t for
every t > 0. Thus, Pr[Tˆ ≤ 0] = Pr[Lap( 1ε′ ) ≤ −1ε ln( lognδ )] = δ2 logn . Let A be the event that at least one
of the log n thresholds Tˆ is at most 0 or some j is sampled more that 2 log(2/δ) times. By the union bound
the probability of A is at most δ. Therefore, for every set of access patterns S
|Pr[AccessLocateP (x) ∈ S]− Pr[AccessLOCATE′P (x) ∈ S]|
=
∣∣∣Pr[AccessLocateP (x) ∈ S|A] Pr[A] + Pr[AccessLocateP (x) ∈ S|A¯] Pr[A¯]
− Pr[AccessLOCATE′P (x) ∈ S|A] Pr[A]− Pr[AccessLOCATE′P (x) ∈ S|A¯] Pr[A¯]
∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣Pr[AccessLocateP (x) ∈ S|A]− Pr[AccessLOCATE′P (x) ∈ S|A]∣∣∣Pr[A]
≤ Pr[A] ≤ δ.
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Thus, by Lemma 2.5, algorithm LocateP is (ε, δ(1 + eε))-differentially oblivious.
We next analyze the running and probe complexity of our algorithm. Let p be the probability that a
uniformly chosen element in x satisfies P . The non-private algorithm that samples elements until it finds an
element satisfying P has expected running time 1/p and the probability that it does not stop after m steps is
(1− p)m = ((1− p)1/p)mp ≤ e−mp. We show that locateP has a similar behavior.
Lemma A.5. Let p be the probability that a uniformly chosen element in x satisfies P . Then, for every
integral power of two m the probability that algorithm locateP probes more than m memory locations is
less than δ/ log n + e−(m−2T )p+2T lnm. In particular, for m = Ω(Tp log(
T
p )), the probability is less than
δ/ log n+ e−O(mp).
Proof. Let t = 2i. The probability that Tˆ ≥ 2T is Pr[Lap( 1ε′ ) ≥ 1ε′ ln lognδ ] = 0.5e− ln(logn/δ) = δlogn .
Assuming that Tˆ ≥ 2T , the probability that the algorithm does not halt after m = 2i steps is less than(
m
2T
)
(1− p)m−2t ≤ m2T e−(m−2T )p ≤ e−(m−2T )p+2T lnm.
A.4 Proof of the Correctness and Privacy of Algorithm SEARCH
Theorem 6.2 is proved in the next 3 claims. We start by analyzing the running time of the algorithm.
Claim A.6. Let β < 1/n and ε < log2 n. The while loop in Algorithm SEARCH is executed at most 2.5 log n
time. Furthermore, the total running time of the algorithm is O(1ε log
2 n log 1β ).
Proof. Let min0,max0 and min1,max1 be the values of min,max before and after an execution of a step
of the while loop in Algorithm SEARCH. Note that
max1−min1 ≤ 1 + (2 · log 1/β
′
ε′ + 1) · max0−min04 log(1/β′)
ε′
≤ 3 · log 1/β′ε′ · max0−min04 log(1/β′)
ε′
= 3(max0−min0)4 .
Therefore, algorithm SEARCH eliminates more than a quarter of the elements in each step of the while loop
and the algorithm will halt after less than 2.5 log n steps.
Moreover, observe that Algorithm SEARCH makes k memory accesses in each step of the while loop
and additional k memory accesses after the loop. Thus, its running time isO(1ε log
2 n(log log n+log 1β )) =
O(1ε log
2 n log 1β ) (since β < 1/n).
Claim A.7. Algorithm SEARCH returns the correct index with probability at least 1− β.
Proof. Let I¯ be the maximal index such that xI¯ ≤ a (i.e., I¯ is the index that algorithm SEARCH should
return). We prove by induction that if all Laplace noises in the algorithm satisfy |Lap( 1ε′ )| < log 1/β
′
ε′ then in
each step of the algorithm min ≤ I¯ ≤ max, hence the algorithm will return I¯ in its last scan of x between
min and max.
The basis of the induction is trivial since 0 ≤ I¯ ≤ n. For the induction step, let min0,max0 and
min1,max1 be the values of min,max before and after an execution of a step of the while loop in Algorithm
SEARCH. By the induction hypothesis, min0 ≤ I¯ ≤ max0. The algorithm finds an index I such that
min0 +Ic ≤ I¯ ≤ min0 +(I + 1)c. By our assumption on the Laplace noise, min1 ≤ min0 +Ic, thus,
min1 ≤ I¯ . Similarly, max1 ≥ min0 +(I + 1)c, thus, max1 ≥ I¯ .
Recall that Pr[|Lap( 1ε′ )| ≥ t/ε′] = e−t for every t > 0. Thus, by Claim A.6 and the union bound, the
probability that one of the Laplace noises is greater than log 1/β
′
ε′ is at most (2.5 log n) · β′ = β. Hence, the
probability that algorithm SEARCH returns the correct index I¯ is at least 1− β.
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Next, we show that algorithm SEARCH is (ε, 0)-differentially oblivious.
Claim A.8. Algorithm SEARCH is an (ε, 0) deferentially oblivious algorithm.
Proof. We show below that each step of the while loop in algorithm SEARCH is (ε′, 0)-differentially obliv-
ious. Applying the basic composition theorem and Claim A.6, we obtain that the SEARCH algorithm is
(ε = (2.5 log n)ε′, 0)-differentially oblivious.
Fix a step of the loop and view it as an algorithm that returns min and max (given these values the
access pattern of the next step is fixed). Let x and x′ be two neighboring datasets such that for some j we
have xj > x′j and xi = x
′
i for all i < j. It holds that xi−1 ≤ x′i ≤ xi for every i. Let I(x) and I(x′)
be the values computed in step 2c of the algorithm on inputs x and x′ respectively. Thus, the value I(x)
is at least the value I(x′) and can exceed it by one. Intuitively, since algorithm SEARCH uses the Laplace
mechanism, the probabilities of returning a value min on x and x′ are at most e±ε′ apart. Formally, if
Lap(1/ε′) + I(x) = Lap(1/ε′) + I(x) (where we consider two independent noises), then the algorithm
returns the same value of min on both inputs. The lemma follows since for every set A:
e−ε
′ ≤ e−|I(x)−I(x′)|ε′ ≤ Pr[Lap(1/ε
′) + I(x) ∈ A]
Pr[Lap(1/ε′) + I(x′) ∈ A] ≤ e
|I(x)−I(x′)|ε′ ≤ eε′ .
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